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Yang Xiang and Wanlei Zhou I 
Abstract 
Recently a number oj highly publici=ed incidents oj DislribuLed Denial oj Sef1 lice (DDoS) auacks 
against high-profile government and commercial websites hcrpe made people aware of the importance 
of providing dala and :ien1jces security to users. A DDoS attack is an availabililY atlack, which is 
characteri=ed by an explicit attempt from an attacker 10 prevent legilimate users of a senice from 
using the desired resources. This paper introduces the vulnerability of web applications 10 DDoS 
attacks, and presents an active distributed dejense system thaI includes a deployment mixture of 
sub-systems 10 proJect web applicalionsj;·om DDoS attacks. According to the simulation experiments. 
this system is effeclive in (hat it is able to defend web applications againsl aflacks. II can avoid overall 
network congestion and provide more resources 10 legitimate web users. 
1. Introduction 
Currently~ web applications are widely spread over the Internet. Accessed by a browser, it provides 
many advantages such as simple administration management, high data and services availability, 
multi-platform compatibility, easy software upgrade, integration and interoperability with other 
systems and so on. Together with presentation oriented web applications, service-oriented web 
applications have developed quickly over recent years. Organizations are investing a large number of 
resources in service-oriented web applications, which offer services over intranets and the Internet. 
To develop a success web application, security and privacy are among the key issues. Much research 
has been conducted exploring security systems for web applications and includes authentication, 
authorization, confidentiality and integrity [4]. However, availability and access control are the other 
important areas that still require further investigation. Recently, the notorious Distributed Denial of 
Service (ODoS) attacks have made people aware of the importance of providing available data and 
services securely to web application users. A DOoS attack is an availability attack, for it is 
characterized by an explicit attempt from an attacker to prevent legitimate users of a service from 
using the desired resource [2]. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), which acts as 
the US FBr's cybercrime unit. warned that there would be ongoing attempts to disrupt web access to 
several sites by using DDoS attacks to cripple targeted web sites [II]. Nowadays web applications 
face serious security problems caused by DDoS attacks. 
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The major contributions in this paper is the analysis of the vulnerabilities in web applications related 
to DDoS attacks, the proposal of a novel active distributed system to protect web applications from 
ODoS attacks by using statistical analysis, and the display of results from completed experiments 
which tested the validity ofthe system. This new system is one oftlle tirst systems that have a mixture 
deployment. which is to deploy sub-systems in both victim end and attack source end, thus achieving 
better defense results over other mechanisms. Since every sub-system cooperates and communicates 
with each other autonomously, it therefore achieves l1igh scalability. 
2. Related WOI'k 
A typical DDoS attack against web applications involves sending a large number of packets to a 
destination. thus causing excessive amounts of endpoint. and possibly transit network bandwidth to 
be consumed [6]. The attack usually stal15 from multiple sources and it aims at a single target. In order 
to launch a DDoS attack, the attacker first scans millions of machines for vulnerable services and 
other weaknesses that permit penetrations, then gains access and compromises these machines 
(handlers and zombies). After that the communication channels between the attacker and the 
compromised machines are established. Staying behind the scenes of an attack, the rea! attacker sends 
a command to the handlers to initiate a coordinated attack. 
Nowadays OOoS attacks have become more sophisticated and more difficult to defeat. Most of the 
current defense systems are passive, which means the defense actions are taken only after the DO'oS 
attacks are launched. Thus essentially, the target host or network is harmed before the attack source(s) 
can be found and controlled. Traditional defending mechanisms include detecting mechanisms and 
reacting mechanisms. The common detection mechanism is to monitor some network characteristics, 
for example, the traffic volume [5], the source IP address [14], and the packet content [12]. After 
detecting the malidous actions of DOoS attacks, the defense system turns into the reacting stage, 
which includes filtering [13], congestion control [9] and traceback [I]. Most of the defense systems 
are deployed at the victim end. Only a few existed systems are source end deployedo such as 
D-WARD (10]. The D-WARO system is used to detect and constrain outgoing attacks from the 
deploying network. However, only this system is incorporates the mixture deployment of both source 
end and victim end defense. For more effective defense. defense systems evolve toward distributed 
and coordinated. 
Most of the current defense systems are not automated and have high false positive in detection 
(mistakenly detellTline the legitimate network activities as the malicious ones). Moreover, 1110st of 
these systems are deployed only at victim end, which cause the lagging response behind the attack. 
Thus inherently. it would not be a potent defense method. It cannot effectively avoid network 
congestion. since the flood has already arrived and congestion control can only be the rescue after the 
event. The defense system proposed in this paper is deployed in both victim end and attacker source 
end, so it greatly enhances the defense capability. 
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3. Vulnerabilities of Web Applications 
The vulnerabilities of web applications for DOcS arise from both the network environment that it 
relies on and the algorithms that are applied. For the first case. flood attacks are the most possible 
DDoS attacks against web applications. This paper mainly concentrates on the flood attacks and the 
countermeasures, The characteristic of the Internet comprising of limited and consumable resources 
is an inherent reason to tempt attacks, Bandwidth, processing power, and storage capacities are all 
targets of attacks. Each web application has limited resources that can be exhausted by a sufficient 
number of users. Therefore when the attacks are successful, the web application can be out of service. 
The DDoS attacker keeps sending malicious packets in a certain long period of time to launch an 
attack. and this kind of attack is called flood attacks, 
Web applications exploit a' set of open application-level protocols. which include HTTP for 
distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information systems, XML to provide information about the 
data in a document to users on various platforms, the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) for 
cross-platform inter-application communication, the Web Services Description Language to describe 
online services, and the universal description, discovery, and integration protocol to find available 
web services on the Internet or corporate networks. etc, All these protocols are mainly on top ofTCP 
protocol for transmission. 
Any system providing TCP-based network services is potentially subject to TCP-based flood attacks. 
The TCP SYN attacks use half-open connections to cause the server to exhaust its resource by keep 
the information describing all pending connections. The result would be a system crash or system 
inoperative. Alternatively. TCP reset attacks also utilize the characteristics of TCP protocol. By 
listening to the TCP connections to the victim, the attacker sends a fake TCP RESET packet to the 
victim. Then it causes the victim to inadvertently terminate its TCP connection. 
Another kind ofDDoS flood attack is the request attack. Any web server is vulnerable to the request 
attack. Attackers keep sending requests to the web server and if there is no protection mechanism 
within the server. it could disable the system. By simply sending multiple requests to the target server, 
the attacker consumes the CPU, memory and storage resources of the victim. Then the server is 
forced to terminate its services. There are other kinds of flood attacks that can hit web applications, 
such as reMP flood, UDP stonn, DNS flood and so on [17]. 
4. DDoS Defense System for Web Applications 
4.1. Distributed Defense System 
The following figure shows the distributed defense system, which protects web applications from 
DDoS attacks, This model is deployed in both victim end and source end, which includes all the 
networks that are near the attacked web application side and near the attacker side. This system is 
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distributed and scalable, and each sub-system communicates by the protecting communication 
network component. Because the DDoS attacks usually come from different networks, this part is 
essential to make a successful defense system. Other components of this defense model consist of an 
intrusion surveillance system, an attack control system and a traceback system. 
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The intrusion surveillance system automatically monitors the potential intrusion actions. It is very 
important for an effective defense system. This study applies, the statistical method to analyze the 
network characteristics. When its sensors find the malicious scanning, propagation, communication 
actions or symptoms by flood of possible attackers, it alerts the attack control system and traceback 
system, and sends the alarm message to the coordinated defense systems. 
The traceback system also plays a key role in the defense system. An effective traceback system relies 
on an ingenious intrusion surveillance system. Simply dropping the malicious paqkets in a passive 
manner is not enough to be a strong protection system against DDoS attacks. So the attack control 
system not only clogs the source attack traffic, but also records the crime actions for later forensic 
purposes. 
4.2. Design Objectives 
The aim of this proposed system is to control the attack as soon as possible, thus reducing the damage 
to a minimum degree. in order to obtain the active defense benefits. The four design objectives of the 
defense system include: 
1. Finding malicious actions as soon as possible 
2. Sharing attacking infonnation such as communication signatures bet\veen coordinated 
sub-systems 
3. Recording the clues of malicious actions for further analyzing, learning and forensic purposes 
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4. A scalable system to protect the network resources, for future deployment in a distributed 
security infrastructure 
4.3. Statistic-based Detection 
To detect the abnormal network characteristics caused by DDoS attacks, many theoretical methods 
can be applied. Two main mathematical methods are the statistical method [8] and the Cumulative 
Sum (CUSUM) method [IS]. The statistic-based detection is used here in order to obtain a simple and 
fast process, and a highly accurate hit rate. 
A network traffic is regarded as a complex statistic model. Any traffic abnormal feature can incur 
some abnormal changes of some values in this model. The assumption of this method is that the 
network traffic variables obey a N~rmal Distribution. Li et al. proposed this decision-making 
mechanism, based on a statistical model [8]. This method is applied to detect the abnormal changes of 
new IP addresses when nem'orks are attacked. The other assumption is that the attacker uses spoofed 
source IP addresses in the attacking packets to avoid traceback. Although network traffic volume 
monitoring may be an easy ,vay to detect DDoS attacks, it cannot differentiate flash crowds fr~m the 
real DDoS attacks [7]. According to lung et aI., during the attacks, most source IP addresses are new 
to the victim. whereas most source IP addresses in a flash crowd have previously appeared before the 
victim. Hence by observing the normal network IP addresses pattern and comparing it with the 
current traffic, the possible attacks can be detected. Therefore the detection probability P d, the false 
alarm probability PI> and the missing probability Pm can be written as follows . 
., I ....c ., 1 _c '.-1'. I I' 
P" = f,. _P; r;;-e 1 d! Pf = fl· r:;-e 1 dl P = 17 -=e -I dl (I) J7 -.J21f J;; v27C .. -00 & . 
Where V is the threshold of distance variable ~,referring to the distance between the experimental 
value and the mean value: J.I:; is the mean of ~ and q is the standard deviation of ~. Let 
" ;(I)=J' _l_e 2df (2) 
-& 
These three probabilities can be written by 
PJ = I-;[(V - J.I;)/ q] 
Given a false alarm probability f, the threshold ~ffor Pf<V.,):S; f is 
Given a detection probability d, the threshold Vd for PAV,,) 2: d is 
For d=l andf=O, the result is: 
Pd =1,Pf =0, 
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So by adjusting the threshold variable the best detection probability, Pd. and least false alarm 
probability, Pf , can be achieved. 
Although the statistical method may not be flexible and adaptable to all the patterns, the detection 
criteria should be amended from time to time. This method is faster than other methods such as 
neural network or data mining because it consumes less computational resources. 
4.4. Simulation 
The cost of building a real distributed testing defense environment for web applications is expensive. 
So a simulation work by a network simulator, SSFNet (Scalable Simulation Framework) [\6], was 
conducted, which provided experimental data for analysis. Although further development and 
deployment of the real system with hardware and software support is required to test the capability 
and efficiency of this system, the test results show that this system can efficiently protect web 
applications from DDoS attacks. 
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Figure 2. Network topology in simulation 
With this capability of building models of large-scale network environments by using the SSFNel 
many experiments were conducted to simulate this system. Figure 2 illustrates the network topology 
for the new experimental DDoS attacks and defense. Four networks were set up, which are linked by 
5 routers. Each network contains several hosts; some are client hosts, and some are server hosts. 
Attacking hosts are deployed in both Network 0 and Network 3, while the victim server is host 1:4 in 
Network 1. 
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Two packages in the SSFNet simulator are used in our experiments. One is a DDoS package and the 
other is a tcpdump package. The DDoS package is used to simulate the TCP SYN flood attack, which 
was described in Section 3.1. The tcpdump package is used to monitor the network traffic by putting 
the network interface card into a . promiscuous mode, which captures every packet going across. 
Although this method can monitor all the features of the IP packet in a time series. only the source [P 
addresses i·n the packets were analyzed. The number of new IP addresses was observed within a time 
period and statistic methods were applied to detect the attack pattern. 
4.5. Results 
In the experiments. the TCP-based tlood attacks were used to simulate the real situation. The 
attacking hosts keep sending SYN packets with spoofed source IP addresses to exhaust the targets 
resources. The protecting communication network component, intrusion surveillance system and 
attack control system of this distributed defense system are deployed at each router. When the attack 
is found in any of these routers by the intrusion surveillance system, attacking signatures are shared 
among the protected routers by the protecting communication network component. Then each 
sub-system takes action by the attack control system. 
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Figure 3. Number of new IP addresses ill different routers 
The numbers of new IP addresses in the routers are shown in figure 3. In Router I :0. the number rises 
dramatically during the attack_ But in the other routers. the rises are not so evident. Because every 
upper router contributes a small part of change, then the overall change can obviously be shown at the 
victim end router. The original traffic volumes in Router 1:0 and Router 0:0 are shown in figure 4. 
Th~ abrupt change traffic volume can be easily detected at the victim end. It is evident that both the 
victim end router and upper routers could suffer congestion. 
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Figure 5. Traffic volume in Router 1:0 and Router 0:0 if defense system deployed at Router 1:0 
By using the statistical method described above. the normal traffic pattern can be modeled. Then in 
each router, an attack control sub-system can filter the malicious packets by comparing the ongoing 
traffic with the normal one. If only the defense system at the victim end is deployed, thus only 
activating the attack control sub-system at the victim end in these experiments. then lots of network 
traffic still will be consumed as is depicted in figure 5. As can be seen in figure 4(b) and figure 5(b) 
there is not much difference in traffic volume of the upper routers between the protected case and the 
unprotected one. And the malicious packets cannot be filtered well, as shown in figure 5(a). 
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Figure 6. Traffic volume in Router 1:0 and 0:0 when attacking packets are dropped at all the routers 
When the defense system is deployed as proposed, then the nemrork traffic is normal as shown in 
figure 6. As can be seen from figure 5(a) and figure 6(a) in the later deployment, less malicious 
packets arrive at the victim end. These two figures obviously show that the amount of filtered 
malicious packets in this proposed deployment is greater than CUITent traditional systems' 
deployment. In figure G(a), the victim end traffic resumes to normal condition, because most of the 
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attacking traffics are controlled in the source end. Figure 6(b) shows how the traffic volume in Router 
0:0 is shaped by the attack control sub-system, which is activated in alrrc)uters. It also demonstrates 
how the global deployment of this defense system is better than other deployments. 
If all the t:ittack . control sub-systems are activated. the traffic volume at the victim end can be 
controlled effectively. In this simulation experiment 98.3% of the malicious packets are tiltered. 
Detecting and filtering the malicious packets as early as possible achieve the design objectives. The 
experiments prove that this approach is a fast and accurate method to detect and control the DDoS 
attacks. Moreover, the mixture of both victim end and source end deployments is a more powerful 
way to protect web applicatiolls from DDoS attacks. 
4.6. Analysis 
Compared with current passive DDoS defense s)'stems, this active defense system does not follow the 
passive protect-detect-react cycle, but rather supports an actiye surveillance-trace-control cycle. In 
this active defense cycle, surveillance is one of the important chains. It is different from the passive 
monitoring action, which is just waiting for the attack signals. Surveillance is used to deploy 
distributed sensors throughout the protected network, which proactively surveys the possible attack 
signatures. Here, attack signatures not only include some patterns which can be used to help 
distinguish malicious packets from normal traffic, but also the malicious scanning signatures, 
propagation patterns and communication patterns of the masters, handlers. and zombies. The control 
stage of the active defense cycle is to block attack packets not only near the victim side, but also close 
to the attack source end. It is a cooperative mechanism in which routers can ask adjacent routers to 
clog an aggregate upstream, in order to penalize the source attacker. 
The benefits of this active defense system not only provide good filtering results, but also assist in 
avoiding the network congestion from the attacker side to target side. If the malicious packets are 
dropped as early a; possible in the upstream routers. then more network resources can be available to 
legitimate users. So this system can protect web applications from DDoS attacks as well as provide 
maximum resources to legitimate users. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, an active distributed system to protect web applications from DOoS attacks was 
presented. The simulation experiments demonstrate how this system can detect DDoS attacks quickly 
and safeguard web applications effectively. Compared with the traditional passive defense systems. it 
provides better filtering. congestion control results and offers more resources for legitimate web users. 
It is the first step towards realizing a distributed web application security system. In the next step, 
experiments in real network environment need to be designed and deployed. · whereby. robust web 
security systems will benefit all societies and countries. 
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